Security
Your people sign in through your identity provider and approve with a passkey, and every permission is denied until it is granted.
Single sign-on
Sign-in uses OpenID Connect at the gateway, with Entra ID in production today. The gateway reads the provider's discovery document, so moving to another OpenID Connect provider is a matter of configuration, and the engine holds no passwords at all.
Sessions
Sessions are held server-side in Redis. The API trusts the gateway and never the browser, and a system action has to present a signed service token rather than a bare header.
Deny by default
Every command, query and endpoint has a permission entry, granted per role per tenant, and a missing entry fails the build instead of leaving a hole.
Four-eyes, by rule
Which actions need approval, who may approve, how many signatures, and under what conditions, such as a drawdown above a threshold needing one from Credit Risk and one from Treasury, are your rules, in settings. Whoever initiated or contributed to a change can never approve it. How countersign is configured →
Passkey-signed approvals
An approver enrols a phone passkey and signs each decision with it, using WebAuthn Level 2. The signature is stored on the approval event and can be verified again months later without the engine's help.
Audit by construction
Who did it, when, and on whose authority are recorded on every event, so the audit trail isn't a log kept beside the system. It is the system.
Bill of materials
A CycloneDX SBOM of the built solution is generated every week and kept as a build artefact, and a customer can have it on request.
Vulnerability scanning
The SBOM is scanned with Grype and the package graph is checked for known-vulnerable dependencies, transitive ones included. The result is a weekly report that a person reviews.
Dependency updates
Dependabot raises updates for .NET packages, the interface's npm packages and the build actions themselves, between the weekly scans.
One Dockerfile, four images
Gateway, API, worker and migrations are built from one file and pushed to a registry per release, so what runs is what was scanned.
Your security team gets a standard identity integration, a maker-checker model that satisfies segregation of duties, and a bill of materials with the release.
We don't host LedgerTM. You or a partner run it, on infrastructure they choose, so the data stays wherever they decide it should, and the operational certifications such as SOC 2 belong to whoever runs it. What we answer for is the software, so that's where our evidence goes.
| Evidence | When |
|---|---|
| A weekly bill of materials and vulnerability scan, reviewed by a person | Today, available under NDA |
| Architecture tests that fail the build on a missing permission or a cross-feature reference | Today, available under NDA |
| Passkey-signed approvals that can be verified independently | Today, in the demonstration tenants |
| An independent penetration test of the software | Before the production release in the first quarter of 2027, with the report available under NDA |